Showing posts with label Abstract Objects. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Abstract Objects. Show all posts

Tuesday, February 23, 2016

The Moral Law Vs The Laws of Nature and the Atonement of Christ for the Sins of the World

In Mere Christianity, C. S. Lewis insisted that the Moral Law is different from the Law of Nature and possesses a different kind of reality independent of us because of its cognitive and conative nature.
...what we usually call the laws of nature–the way weather works on a tree for example–may not really be laws in the strict sense, but only in a manner of speaking. When you say that falling stones always obey the law of gravitation, is not this much the same as saying that the law only means ‘what stones always do’? You do not really think that when a stone is let go, it suddenly remembers that it is under orders to fall to the ground. You only mean that, in fact, it does fall. In other words, you cannot be sure that there is anything over and above the facts themselves, any law about what ought to happen, as distinct from what does happen. The laws of nature, as applied to stones or trees, may only mean ‘what Nature, in fact, does’. But if you turn to the Law of Human Nature, the Law of Decent Behaviour, it is a different matter. That law certainly does not mean ‘what human beings, in fact, do’; for as I said before, many of them do not obey this law at all, and none of them obey it completely.

....The Moral Law, or Law of Human Nature, is not simply a fact about human behaviour in the same way as the Law of Gravitation is, or may be, simply a fact about how heavy objects behave. On the other hand, it is not a mere fancy, for we cannot get rid of the idea, and most of the things we say and think about men would be reduced to nonsense if we did. And it is not simply a statement about how we should like men to behave for our own convenience; for the behaviour we call bad or unfair is not exactly the same as the behaviour we find inconvenient, and may even be the opposite. Consequently, this Rule of Right and Wrong, or Law of Human Nature, or whatever you call it, must somehow or other be a real thing–a thing that is really there, not made up by ourselves. And yet it is not a fact in the ordinary sense, in the same way as our actual behaviour is a fact. It begins to look as if we shall have to admit that there is more than one kind of reality; that, in this particular case, there is something it is not a fact in the ordinary sense, in the same way as our actual behaviour is a fact. It begins to look as if we shall have to admit that there is more than one kind of reality; that, in this particular case, there is something above and beyond the ordinary facts of men’s behaviour, and yet quite definitely real–a real law, which none of us made, but which we find pressing on us.
.....
Let us sum up what we have reached so far. In the case of stones and trees and things of that sort, what we call the Laws of Nature may not be anything except a way of speaking. When you say that nature is governed by certain laws, this may only mean that nature does, in fact, behave in a certain way. The so-called laws may not be anything real–anything above and beyond the actual facts that we observe. But in the case of Man we saw that this will not do. The Law of Human Nature, or of Right and Wrong, must be something above and beyond the actual facts of human behaviour. In this case, besides the actual facts, you have something else–a real law which we did not invent and which we know we ought to obey.
Lewis' anti-realism is evident in his opposition of the idea that mathematical objects exist [see quote by Craig]. However, his argument for the existence of the moral law was crucial for his establishment of the moral law argument for the existence of God. The moral law, certainly, cannot depend on humans; it has to be "beyond the actual facts of human behaviour". Lewis cannot see the moral law as being similar to the laws of nature because of the element of choice that humans have and the fact that they usually do not obey the moral law. It is not a deterministic part of their being; of course, it cannot be, for man is a free being. It is not the same as the involuntary laws of human physiology. They are voluntary laws, by definition. But, why can't they be intrinsic to volition (persons) in the same way that natural laws are intrinsic to mechanism (things)? Thus, they are not deterministic (as in mechanical laws), but conscientious (involving freedom of choice).
..for when Gentiles, who do not have the law, by nature [Gr.phusis] do the things in the law, these, although not having the law, are a law to themselves, who show the work of the law written in their hearts [intrinsically], their conscience also bearing witness, and between themselves their thoughts accusing or else excusing them). (Rom 2:14-15, parenthetics mine)
The moral law is the way persons are related to each other, but persons are volitional beings; therefore, there is the a priori understanding of the moral law in the sense of an ought. In its fundamental nature, it is love. However, in the complexities of human relations (family, marriage, society, nationality, etc), the implications of the ought are multiplied. Animals are free of these. But, man created in the image and likeness of God is morally accountable. Volitionality cannot be denied, for it explains why people think morally and make moral choices. Sin is sin because it violates the unity of persons and creates disunity and alienation among them; it is a violation of the eternal order of love that is the order of unity among persons whose Head is God; it is violation of persons, and is, ultimately, irreverence towards God; therefore, sin is not a temporal issue but a cosmic one. It is personal. The punishment/wages/fruit of sin is divine abandonment into Godless alienation--eternal death:
...it is a righteous thing with God to repay with tribulation those who trouble you, and to give you who are troubled rest with us when the Lord Jesus is revealed from heaven with His mighty angels, in flaming fire taking vengeance on those who do not know God, and on those who do not obey the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ. These shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of His power (2Th 1:6-9, emphatics mine)
If the law was just extrinsic to all relations then "Can a man be profitable to God, though he who is wise may be profitable to himself? Is it any pleasure to the Almighty that you are righteous? Or is it gain to Him that you make your ways blameless?" (Job 22:2-3); and again, "If I have sinned, what have I done to you, O watcher of men? Why have you made me your target? Have I become a burden to you?" (Job 7:20 NIV) But, Justice is the relational act of unity among persons. Where there is alienation, the solution is reconciliation. Where there is no reconciliation (voluntary, not mechanical), there is separation. Therefore, voluntary faith in Christ is essential to reconciliation in which God Himself has taken the first voluntary steps towards reconciliation. The Sacrifice of Christ is the price of this reconciliation which God paid in order to be the suffering member of this covenant. The cost of discipleship is what we pay in order to be part of this reconciliation. Therefore, that He died for all cannot mechanically save all. The bridge is not mechanical; it is volitional. Therefore, it is not just mental faith that saves, faith has to be active, the step towards and in reconciliation. Christ carried His cross, but we can only be His disciples if we carry our cross and follow Him.

See Also
Hamartiology (Notes)

Additional References.
2/25/2016
Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book I.13
It will now be well to make a complete classification of just and unjust actions. We may begin by observing that they have been defined relatively to two kinds of law, and also relatively to two classes of persons. By the two kinds of law I mean particular law and universal law. Particular law is that which each community lays down and applies to its own members: this is partly written and partly unwritten. Universal law is the law of Nature. For there really is, as every one to some extent divines, a natural justice and injustice that is binding on all men, even on those who have no association or covenant with each other. It is this that Sophocles' Antigone clearly means when she says that the burial of Polyneices was a just act in spite of the prohibition: she means that it was just by nature.
Not of to-day or yesterday it is,
But lives eternal: none can date its birth.
And so Empedocles, when he bids us kill no living creature, says that doing this is not just for some people while unjust for others,
Nay, but, an all-embracing law, through the realms of the sky
Unbroken it stretcheth, and over the earth's immensity.

Are Abstract Objects Real? or Did God Create Abstract Objects, If There Are Anything Like That?

Christian philosophers have debated this issue for some time. Some believe that abstract objects exist; others, that they don’t exist; still others, that the question is meaningless. Views such as Platonic realism hold that abstract ideas and objects (such as the laws of logic and mathematical objects) have objective existence independent of minds. Some Christian theologians believe that abstract objects cannot exist independently; for if they did, they would nullify the doctrine of divine aseity, which states that there is nothing that is co-eternal with God. But, what about the view that abstract objects were created and are part of the invisible creation of God? For example, can it be possible that numbers don’t exist (not number of things, but the numbers themselves)? If numbers don’t exist, how can numbers be the object of our knowledge and how can mathematical propositions be called true if they do not correspond to reality? If knowledge a subject-object relationship, how can one know a thing if the object doesn't exist objectively?

Let’s take the example of the laws of logic. We know that these laws are self-evident, self-explanatory, self-sustaining, universal, necessary, transcendent, and immutable. One will need to affirm them in order to even attempt to deny them. Suppose the laws of logic exist in reality, they would immediately possess ontic infinitude, in which case one faces the question: Are these laws co-eternal with God or does God Himself submit to the laws of logic?

One problem with realism is the gap between the abstract and the concrete. For instance, Platonic realism cannot satisfactorily explain how concrete things participate in the eternal forms and ideas. We can talk about one mango and two mangoes, but what does it mean that one and two exist independently of things? We may use symbols to represent these numbers and when we try to imagine numbers we imagine those symbols, but do these numbers exist by themselves independently of things? Similarly, we think of shapes, of triangles, squares, and circles. We can conceive of these and use symbols to state propositions; however, does it mean that these propositions are only true because there are real abstract shapes to which these correspond (especially since one claims that there is no perfect triangle, square, or circle in the physical world)? Why not say that they correspond to the design of this world or the way in which God created this world to function in the way that He designed it to function? And so, the ideas or principles don’t exist by themselves but only in relation to the design of things? In other words, they are our discernment of design, order, similarity, and harmony in the world of things.

But, what about the laws of logic? Aren’t they invisible realities that necessarily exist out there? “Out there” is not sufficient; one needs to specify where this “out there” is? Nobody knows where the Platonic world of ideas exists, anyway.

The laws of logic only tell us how terms relate to each other and how we may infer those relations. In other words, the laws of logic are the way our mind is designed to reason in order to draw inferences regarding the relation of terms to each other. In drawing inferences, the mind recognizes similarities, differences, and several other modes of relation. Without terms, the laws are empty and meaningless. For instance, if I want to state the law of identity as “A=A”, then at least the term A has to be pre-supposed in order to state the law of identity. If no such term exists, then the law of identity will itself be the term it is identical with. For any terms A and B (A and B as we understand in our spatio-temporal experience), the laws of logic will show the relation between both of them. These terms may be names (or pronouns) of concrete objects (Socrates) or abstract objects (Man). Thus, the laws of logic are similar to the laws of nature. The relation between an object and air is a matter of the laws of aerodynamics. Similarly, we have hydrodynamics and thermodynamics. The theory of relativity tries to tell us the relation between objects and space-time. Similarly, the laws of logic tell us how terms relate with each other.

In this sense, the laws of logic are intrinsic to reasoning minds, the way minds are designed to think in order to know facts about the world they live in. However, they are just formal causes and not efficient causes. Therefore, minds err in reasoning. Laws of logic cannot cause right thinking because they are not objects out there. The efficient cause is the thinker himself and his act of processing thought-data. Therefore, in dreams, thoughts can sometimes go berserk and things that look consistent within dreams are shockingly realized to be inconsistent in the waking state (Of course, there are dreams which have deep consistencies too). There are no laws of logic outside of thinking minds. Invalid reasoning can lead to false conclusions in the same way that wrong flying can lead to wrong results.

What does this imply? First of all, it implies that the laws of logic are relative to the way we are designed to perceive and know this world. Let’s say that they help us to see the world as it is with the help of the limited faculties of perception we have; the faculties designed by God for purposes we are created to fulfill.

Secondly, it implies that the laws of logic are universal with reference to only our world. At least, we can say that they only relate to the concept of terms which have conceptual significance only in our world of experience. In that sense, they help us to gain a true understanding of reality as far as our conceptual faculties allow. However, if one tried to apply logic to anything more, the results would lead to paradoxes. For example, we may divide space into feet, and feet into inches; however, if we separate reason from experience and try to apply divisibility to the idea of space itself, the result would be infinite divisions (and conflicts with experience). We know of some philosophers who dumped the validity empirical data because they thought experience stood in conflict with reason. Just because reason can conceive of perfect shapes and infinity of numbers (not that it can conceive infinity, for infinity is disallowance of limit in our mental imagination) and infinitude of objectless space does not mean that these concepts exist as objects out there, somewhere.

Thirdly, it means that God designed the world in His wisdom; it does not mean that He created the design itself as an abstract reality that was independent of Him. We need to be careful to not idolize our speech about God. If it were not for the revelation of God, there was no possibility to know of God in the way that Christian theology talks of Him. We know that design and order are eternal concepts, but they don’t exist as objects out there. We know that God is love, but that doesn’t mean love exists as an eternal immaterial object, independent of God. One can only talk of the creation of something if it exists as an object of reality.

Fourthly, it means that the abstract ideas that we have are nothing but the names that our mind gives to generalizations (laws, state of affairs, events, properties, etc) in order for knowledge to be possible; for knowledge is nothing but an understanding of the relation of one term to another (the relation between the subject and the object). Propositions are statements about a particular's relation to a universal (e.g. Socrates is a Man) or a particular's relation to another particular through a universal (Alexander was the son of Philip) or a universal's relation to another universal (Love is Patient), and the various modes and complexities of relations (variety, modes, complexities, relations are all abstracts).

What are the implications of this for theology? There should be many. For instance, this would make questions like "Did God create Sin?" "Who created Evil?" meaningless. God did not create abstract objects like Sin or Evil. Sin is a relational term, so is Evil, both of which refer to reality but not in the sense of possessing objective reality independent of phenomena. Also, this will help us to more clearly understand statements such as "He condemned sin in the flesh" (Rom.8:3). This sin was not some cosmic object out there, but human sin against God condemned in the flesh of Christ, when he bore the punishment of our iniquities. Sin is not just an abstract idea, it is a concrete act positively deserving condemnation. The moral law is the way moral (volitional) beings are meant to relate to each other. Volitional violation of this relation is sin, sin against all affected by this relational violation, primarily God. The moral order is not just a set of commandments, but the way persons relate to each other ("the way they ought to" being the knowledge of the moral law present in the hearts of volitional beings, given as the a priori basis for moral choices). It is the same order in which the Three Persons in the Divine Godhead relate to each other (in love). When God created the world, it was a natural world; but, when He created man, the world became a moral world with man possessing moral freedom to be towards or against God in his moral relation. When Adam disobeyed, sin entered the world (not as an abstract object but as a concrete act), since Adam sinned. When Christ obeyed, sin was destroyed in His flesh (not as an abstract object but as a concrete act); also sin was judged (for He took the concrete punishment for all our concrete sins) in His flesh.


Related Web Content:
Abstract Objects (Stanford Encyclopedia or Philosophy)
Three Views on Creation, Causality, and Abstracta: A discussion between William Lane Craig, J.T. Bridges, and Peter Van Inwagen
The Theory of Abstract Objects: Supports scientific realism and the existence of abstract objects.